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THE V-CHIP DEBATE: BLOCKING TELEVISION
SEX, VIOLENCE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly half a century, Congress and the courts have struggled with
the perceived negative influences of radio and television on society. The
responses have ranged from banning obscenity and restricting indecent
speech to abridging the First Amendment rights of the broadcast industry.
Television violence, the most recent issue to surface, presents a
serious conflict between protecting children from the potentially harmful
influence of exposure to violence, and the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters. Congress fired the latest salvo in this struggle with the
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.' Section 551, entitled
"Parental Choice in Television Programming," requires all new television
sets with screens thirteen inches or larger to contain a V-Chip within two
years, a device that allows parents to automatically block programs that
have been labeled as containing high levels of violence or sex.2
This Comment addresses the constitutionality of the V-Chip legislation
in light of public interests and media rights. Part II reviews the effect of
television violence on children and the reasons behind current levels of
televised violence. Part III analyzes the V-Chip technology. Part IV
reviews the requirements of the V-Chip legislation and the response to that
legislation. Part V analyzes the V-Chip legislation in the context of the
First Amendment and summarizes the constitutional issues. Finally, Part
VI proposes a solution to the issues raised by the V-Chip legislation.
II. THE EPIDEMIC OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE
A. The Effect of Television Violence
"The American Psychological Association estimates that the average
American child sees more than 100,000 acts of violence and 8000 murders
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139-42
(1996).
2. See id.
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on television before reaching adolescence . .. ."' This alarming statistic
exposes a problem of increasing public concern: what negative effect does
television violence have on children and what can be done to stop it?
Numerous studies have been conducted in an effort to determine how
exposure to television violence affects the social and psychological well-
being of both children and adults. The American Psychological As-
sociation's commission on violence and youth, for example, found a
correlation between exposure to high levels of television violence and
increased aggressive behavior in children and adolescents.4 Experts most
often cite an "increase[d] ... likelihood of aggressive or antisocial
behavior" due to children's viewing of violent programs including
cartoons. 5 Moreover, the effects of television violence are cumulative,
with increased viewing of violent programs leading to higher levels of
aggression in children who watch such programs.6
Following the initial showing of The Deer Hunter on network
television, twenty-nine copycat incidents of the movie's Russian-roulette
scene were reported As a result, twenty-six adults and children died of
self-inflicted gunshot wounds to the head.' In a similar act of life
imitating television, a five-year-old boy set fire to his trailer home after
watching an episode of MTV's Beavis and Butthead in which the
characters played with fire and joked about fire being "cool." 9 As a result
of this act, the boy's two-year-old sister was killed.'0
A February 1996 study conducted by four universities and commis-
sioned by the cable industry concluded that television violence is far more
pervasive than previously imagined." The study analyzed 2693 television
programs on 23 channels during a 20 week period."l Violent acts were
defined as "any overt depiction of the use of physical force--or the
3. Vincent Kiernan, A Chip to Veto Violence on Television, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 14, 1993,
at 5.
4. Videodrome, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at 73.
5. Alexander K.C. Leung, M.B.B.S. et al., Children & Television, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Oct.
1994, at 909, 912.
6. Id.
7. Amitai Etzioni, Lock up Your TV Set, NAT'L. REV., Oct. 18, 1993, at 50.
8. Id.
9. John Windhausen, Congressional Interest in the Problem of Television and Violence, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 788 (1994).
10. Id.
11. MEDIASCOPE, INC., NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
(1994-95). The Council included members of the American Medical Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychological
Association. Id. at vii.
12. Id. at 6-7.
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credible threat of such force--intended to physically harm an animate being
or group of beings."' 3  The definition also included verbal threats of
physical harm and scenes depicting the aftermath of unseen violent acts. 4
The key findings of the study included:
1. The risks of viewing depictions of televised violence include
learning aggressive attitudes and behavior, desensitization to the harmful
effects of violence, and developing a fear of becoming a victim of
violence. "
2. Perpetrators of television violence go unpunished in seventy-three
percent of all violent scenes.
16
3. The negative effects of violence are often not portrayed. Victims
suffer no harm in forty-seven percent of all violent scenes. 7 "Only 16%
of all . . . programs depict[ed] the long-term negative" effects of violence
including psychological, emotional, and financial harm.'"
4. Twenty-five percent of all violent scenes on television involve a
handgun."'
5. Violence was found in fifty-seven percent of the programs on
television.2" Eighty-five percent of the programming on premium cable
channels contained violence as opposed to only eighteen percent of the
programs on public broadcast television.2' Broadcast networks contained
violence on forty-four percent of their programming.22
6. Variation was also found among programming categories. One-
hundred percent of police shows contained violence, "as do 85% of tabloid
news programs.., and 15% of talk shows."23
In 1972, the Surgeon General's Office concluded that "the causal
relationship between televised violence and anti-social behavior warranted
appropriate and immediate remedial action."'24 The courts have expressed
a similar opinion. Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit,
dissenting from a decision upholding the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's ("FCC") safe harbor for indecency, stated that violent programming
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4.
16. MEDIASCOPE, supra note 11, at 15.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 9.
21. MEDIASCOPE, supra note 11, at x.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 32.
24. Colman McCarthy, Boycotting Glorified Violence, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at A19.
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has a harmful effect." A second, more obscure effect of exposure to
television violence is the desensitization of viewers to the adverse effects
of aggressive behavior which ultimately leads to a greater tolerance of
"real" violence. 6
B. The Market for TV Violence
1. Advertising Influence
The television industry has long considered violence an effective
means of attracting viewers.27 Viewers wanted action and the broadcast
industry responded. As early as the 1960s, the American Broadcasting
Company ("ABC") found that programs featuring action and violence, such
as The Untouchables and The Rebel, produced higher ratings and
corresponding increases in program longevity and advertising revenues.28
The proliferation of cable pay-per-view and premium stations, which
are not subject to the FCC's public interest standards, has led to an increase
in broadcast violence. Broadcasters responded to the new competition by
increasing provocative and violent material to attract more viewers.
In recent years, however, this appetite for action and violence has
waned.29 Viewers still demand action, but are less willing to tolerate
violence. The public outcry to reduce televised violence has been
supported by at least one study that determined violent programs actually
receive lower ratings than non-violent programs.30
III. THE TECHNOLOGY
The violence chip, commonly known as the V-Chip, appears to offer
a practical solution to the problem of television violence. The V-Chip is
a programmable computer chip that will be installed in new television sets
with screen thirteen inches or larger. It will decode rating information
about each program and block programs containing a violence rating above
25. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards,
J., dissenting).
26. Meg Greenfield, TV's True Violence, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993, at 72.
27. Stephen J. Kim, "Viewer Discretion Is Advised": A Structural Approach to the Issue
of Television Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1422-23 (1994).
28. Id. at 1423.
29. Id. at 1430.
30. Id. (citing George Gerbner, Highlights of the Television Profile No. 16, at 2-3 (Jan. 27,
1994) (unpublished manuscript presented at the National Association of Television Program
Executives' Annual Conference, Miami Beach, Fla.)).
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the level set by parents." Television programs will carry coding signals
in the vertical blanking interval, the black bar that appears when a
television loses vertical hold,3 2 along with Extended Data Service ("EDS")
signals for emergency alerts, weather advisories, and closed captioning
signals.
33
The Electronics Industries Association's Television Data Systems
subcommittee has already proposed a technical standard for the V-Chip
technology. 34 The V-Chip data packet would contain the violence rating
or other ratings in three data bits.35 Each data bit has a possible value of
0 or 1, thus providing up to eight combinations of ratings from 000 to
111.36 "Three other [data] bits ... are reserved for program content
advisories."37
The V-Chip signal would be transmitted as a "data packet in the
vertical blanking interval" of a television program.3' The V-Chip could
be programmed by the television owner to block viewing of V-rated
programs during certain hours.39
Inclusion of V-Chips in new televisions is estimated to cost between
$5 and $40 per television.4° The actual V-Chip will cost only about $5
each,4 but lower priced televisions will likely require additional circuitry
and wiring, costing up to $35 per unit.42 Most of that circuitry is already
present in more expensive models.43
A trial version of the V-Chip underwent testing on a premium pay
service in Edmonton, Canada early in 1995.' Programs were rated for
(1) violence, (2) language, and (3) sexual content and nudity, and were
coded with a single digit, ranging from one to nine, in each of the
31. Murray Slovick, The Violence Chip, POPULAR MECHANICS, May, 1994, at 114.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Slovick, supra note 31, at 114.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 115.
39. Id.
40. Lewis M. Andrews, Private Ratings, NAT'L REV., Sept. 25, 1995, at 81, 82.
41. Id.
42. Glen Dickson, How's it Work? The V-chip Is Based on Closed-Captioning Technology,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 12, 1996, at 24.
43. Id.
44. Daniel Howard Cerone, 'V-Chip' for TVs: Boon to Parents or Big Brother?, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at Al; see also Craig Turner, Not Ready for Prime Time, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
28, 1995, at DI.
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categories.45 More explicit programs were assigned higher numerical
values.46 Ratings closely paralleled those given to the movies during their
theatrical release.47 A movie with an "R" theatrical rating was rated a
seven in all three categories.48
A second test is underway in which the ratings system have been
simplified.49 In this newest test, programs are rated from zero to five in
each of three categories: violence, language, and sexual content.5°
Parents will be able to set acceptable thresholds for their families."' For
instance, if they set their V-Chip to level three in each of the categories,
then any program that exceeds a three in any of the categories will be
blocked.52
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Tele-
communications Act") requires all television sets with screens larger than
thirteen inches to be equipped with circuitry capable of selectively blocking
coded programs.53 This carefully worded law suggests that broadcasters
voluntarily rate programs and send the rating signal, but does not actually
require them to do so.54
The Telecommunications Act is not without its shortcomings. First,
the law does not address inherent non-glamorized violence that appears in
television news programs and sporting events. Second, the law encourages
broadcasters to establish their own rating system, but authorizes the FCC
to appoint an advisory committee to create a rating system if one is not
established by the broadcasters within one year of the Act's passage. 5
The advisory committee is to consist of parents, television broadcasters,
45. Turner, supra note 44, at D4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Jim Impoco, Another view of TV ratings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19, 1996, at
37.
50. Id. at 39.
51. See generally id.
52. Id.
53. Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
THE V-CHIP DEBATE
television producers, cable operators, public interest groups, and other
interested individuals.5 6 Critics complain that this provision could place
the government in the position of determining violence ratings and,
ultimately, which programs are broadcast. Government regulation of
television violence raises significant constitutional concerns because of First
Amendment restrictions upon the ability of the government to limit
television violence."
B. Response to the V-Chip
1. The Public
The V-Chip has found support with the general public. A 1995
Hollywood Reporter poll indicated eighty-two percent of Americans favor
the V-Chip.58  The cable industry also endorses the V-Chip. 9  Ted
Turner, president and chairman of Turner Broadcasting System ("TBS"),
has expressed support for the V-Chip technology.60 Yet support has been
cautious." Matthew Blank, president of Showtime Networks has stated,
"[w]e have some serious societal issues here. The Vchip [sic] seems like
an overly simple solution to a very complicated problem.,
62
Opponents of the V-Chip include the conservative Christian Coalition,
the liberal American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"),63 the National
Association of Broadcasters, the Motion Picture Association of America,
and the Radio and Television News Directors Association.' Some
opponents argue that the V-Chip is unconstitutional because the law's
definition of violence is vague, overbroad, and unnecessarily inhibits the
free speech rights of the media.
56. Id.
57. Benjamin P. Deutsch, Wile E. Coyote, Acme Explosives and the First Amendment: The
Unconstitutionality of Regulating Violence on Broadcast Television, 60 BROOK. L. REV. I 101,
1104 (1994). See generally James A. Albert, Constitutional Regulation of Televised Violence, 64
VA. L. REv. 1299 (1978) (arguing that regulatory measures restricting violence on television
should not be barred by the First Amendment).
58. Cerone, supra note 44, at A32.
59. Slovick, supra note 31, at 114.
60. /d.
61. Ginia Bellafante, Locking Out Violence, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 64.
62. Id.
63. Dennis Wharton, Nets Bow Chip Alternative, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 2, 1995, at 3.
64. House Passes Dereg Bill, MEDIAWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 6.
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2. Broadcast and Cable Industries
The broadcast industry cites several problems with the V-Chip,
including advertiser response and the inability of the V-Chip to distinguish
among different types of violence. Broadcasters are concerned about the
response of advertisers who may be reluctant to sponsor controversial
shows.65  Tabloid shows, such as A Current Affair and Hard Copy,
quickly learned that controversial re-enactments hurt their advertising
appeal when their sponsors stopped advertising.66 Both Proctor & Gamble
and Kraft Foods, for example, have policies against advertising during
programs with excessive violence.67  In fact, A Current Affair saw an
increase in advertisers when it began to avoid re-enactments.68
Broadcasters were quick to join critics of the V-Chip law, calling it
unconstitutional and arguing that labeling constitutes censorship. 69 A
Capital Cities/ABC spokesperson said, "this is clearly the first step on the
road to government regulation of what we air.' 70
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Massachusetts) insists that the
law presents absolutely no impact on freedom of speech rights.7
"Broadcasters will still have every right to create any program they want,
they will have the right to use any words or visual images they want, and
they will have the right to transmit those images or words to every home
in America if they want., 72 Representative Markey argues that it is the
First Amendment rights of parents and children that are really at stake:
73
If broadcasters are allowed to air any and all programming they
want, then parents should have the right to block out any and all
programing [sic] that they don't want. In that way, there's a
perfect constitutional synergy that allows for the right to speak
65. Id. Senator Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) stated the broadcasters "made [it] very clear to me
the thing they're concerned about is that it will put them at an economic disadvantage compared
to the cable industry." Cerone, supra note 44, at A32.
66. Raymond L. Fischer, Is it Possible to Regulate Television Violence?, USA TODAY, July
1994, at 72, 75.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Experts Tackle V-Chip, TELEVISION DIG., Aug. 28, 1995, at 4.
70. Christopher Stern, Clinton Puts V-Chip on Fast Track, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July
17, 1995, at 6.
71. Edward J. Markey, Why the Markey Chip Won't Hurt You, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
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and the right to keep speech out of homes of individuals with
small children.
That's the balance that we've struck with the First
Amendment and individual rights for 200 years, and this bill
continues that tradition without in any way impeding First
Amendment rights of broadcasters to say whatever they want.74
Broadcasters also argue that rating systems are flawed because they
are unable to distinguish between various types of violence.75 Critics
claim that a V-Chip cannot distinguish between Terminator, Alien, and
Schindler 's List.76 Each of these programs would carry similar ratings
without consideration of the educational or historical value of the latter.
According to Lynn McReynolds, Vice President of Media Affairs for the
National Association of Broadcasters, "[w]e have problems with any
technology that makes a blanket judgment about programming.,
77
Broadcasters also cite the burdensome nature of rating thousands of
hours of programming, 78 and the inevitable slippery-slope effect.
79
Today it is the violence chip, tomorrow it will be the sex chip, the
commercial chip, the game show chip, or perhaps the news chip.8"
The broadcasters and networks have a self-serving concern about a
technology that allows parents to block hundreds of television shows with
the push of a button, thus sacrificing advertising revenue.8 Generally,
broadcasters prefer an educational approach that would train parents in
making smart choices.82 In place of a V-Chip, broadcasters support a
blocking device that would allow parents to block specific shows or
channels without the use of a rating system.83 Representative Markey
criticized the networks' blocking device solution as wholly unworkable
stating that "[p]arents cannot go through every single program on every
single page of TV Guide every single week."'"
The cable industry is far less concerned than the broadcast industry
about the response of advertisers, which explains their lukewarm support
74. Id.
75. Cerone, supra note 44, at A33.
76. Id.
77. Bellafante, supra note 61, at 64.
78. Cerone, supra note 44, at A33.
79. Etzioni, supra note 7, at 54.
80. Id.
81. Wharton, supra note 63, at 13; see also Bellafante, supra note 61, at 64.
82. Cerone, supra note 44, at A32.
83. Christopher Stem, Broadcasters Seek V-Chip-Less Solution, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
July 24, 1995, at 17.
84. Markey, supra note 71, at 11.
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of the V-Chip. Cable broadcasters typically derive only a small fraction of
their revenue from advertising, relying instead on fundraisers, grants,
subscriptions, and local cable revenues." In addition, the cable industry
has generally been more proactive in controlling programming content. For
example, Lifetime Television, a cable channel, screens its programming for
gratuitous violence against women.86
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech .... ."" The First Amendment guaran-
tees freedom of speech, but does not define it. A number of doctrines have
emanated from the Supreme Court in an effort to define the extent of First
Amendment protection for the freedom of speech. The constitutionality of
the V-Chip legislation will likely focus on First Amendment issues
including content-based restrictions and the pervasive nature of television.
A. Content-Based Restrictions
When government seeks to regulate speech because of its perceived
impact, the courts require substantial justification and subject the regulation
to the highest level of scrutiny. Generally, content-based restrictions are
held to be unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates that the
restriction is "reasonably necessary to achieve ... compelling [govern-
mental] interests .... ,,"" However, the Supreme Court has held that some
categories of speech, such as obscenity and defamation, are not entitled to
First Amendment protection.89  Content-based restrictions of these
categories of speech are subject to a lower standard of scrutiny in
determining their constitutionality.9 °  First Amendment protection for
television violence depends on whether it belongs to one of several
categories of unprotected speech.
While the Supreme Court has never addressed violence in the
broadcast media, the Court has identified several categories of speech
85. Cerone, supra note 44, at A32.
86. Jim McConville, Programmers Oppose Content Control, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July
3, 1995, at 22; Fischer, supra note 66, at 73.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
88. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992).
89. See id. at 382-84 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)) (recognizing that obscenity and defamation are not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech).
90. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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outside the protective arms of the First Amendment including obscenity,9'
incitement to illegal action,92 and indecent speech. 93 An examination of
cases in these areas is useful in determining the constitutionality of the V-
Chip legislation.
1. Obscenity
Obscene speech falls outside the scope of First Amendment protection
and is subject to government regulation. In Miller v. California,94 the
Supreme Court defined an obscene work as one that:
(a)... "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (b). .. depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by ... state
law; and (c)... taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.95
Generally the Court has justified banning obscene speech based on
overriding societal interests.96
The definition of obscenity under Miller is not likely to encompass
television violence. The definition focuses solely on offensive sexual
conduct and does not include other objectionable activities. Despite the
numerous studies addressing the impact of violence on children,97 the
Supreme Court is unlikely to analogize violent acts on television to
obscenity. Therefore it is not likely that this speech is unprotected under
a Miller analysis.
91. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-84 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)).
92. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
93. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 n.27 (1978); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971).
94. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
95. Id. at 24. Material appealing to the "prurient interest" is defined as "material whose
predominate appeal is to [excite) 'a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion."'
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957)).
96. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (concluding that concern for
public safety justifies suppression of obscene materials). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 753 (1982) (upholding a New York statute prohibiting the distribution of materials portraying
children engaged in sexual activities based on the state's compelling interest in protecting
children).
97. See, e.g., Leung, supra note 5.
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2. Incitement of Illegal Action
Speech that incites illegal action is another category that is not
afforded full First Amendment protection. In 1969, the Supreme Court
enunciated the current incitement test.98 The Brandenburg test has three
requirements which must be met in order to find incitement and therefore
unprotected speech. First, the danger posed by the speech must be
imminent.99 Second, the speaker must intend to cause imminent lawless
action. Finally, that action must be likely to occur.
Television violence is unlikely to rise to the level of incitement.
While studies have suggested a causal connection between television
violence and real-world violence,"° no study has proven that the latter is
an imminent result of the former. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
suggest that broadcasters intend their programming to cause a violent
response.
B. Abridged First Amendment Rights of the Broadcast Media
Indecent and offensive speech generally remain constitutionally
protected expression. The Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated its
willingness to protect offensive speech in situations where the offended
person is able to turn his or her attention elsewhere, especially when the
offensive conduct takes place outside the privacy of the home. 10' But full
First Amendment protection for indecent speech does not extend to
broadcasting."' Concerns over the presence of children in the viewing
audience, the limited number of available channels, and the pervasive
nature of broadcasting are common justifications of FCC regulations of
indecent broadcast programming. 3
98. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
99. Id. at 447.
100. Leung, supra note 5.
101. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 n.27 (1978); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that persons offended by Mr. Cohen's jacket emblazoned with the phrase
"Fuck the Draft" could have avoided further offense by "averting their eyes").
102. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
103. Id. at 748-50. See infra part V.B.3.
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1. Children in the Viewing Audience
In the late 1980s, the FCC cracked down on indecency during hours
when children were likely to be watching television." Shortly thereafter,
Congress enacted legislation creating a safe harbor, between twelve
midnight and six o'clock a.m., during which time stations could broadcast
indecent but not obscene programming.'0 5 In November of 1993, the
D.C. Circuit nullified an FCC ban on indecent material between the hours
of six o'clock a.m. and twelve o'clock midnight on the ground that it was
not the least restrictive means to protect children."° Furthermore, the
rules were too broad to be considered constitutional.10 7 The court stated
that the burden was on the government to justify and narrowly tailor its
attempts to restrict speech protected by the First Amendment. 8  In
response, the FCC extended the safe harbor to eight o'clock p.m., thereby
narrowing the speech restriction."
2. Scarcity of the Spectrum
While broadcasters have First Amendment rights, these rights are not
as extensive or inviolable as those of other media."0 The Supreme Court
has accepted the scarcity rationale to justify content-based regulation of the
broadcast media."' The Supreme Court opined that the scarce nature of
the wavelength spectrum allows the government to set content requirements
in order to maximize the public benefits derived from broadcasting." 2
104. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992) [hereinafter Action for Children 's Television 1H].
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1992); 3 F.C.C.R. 930, n.47 (1987).
106. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Action for Children's Television III].
107. Id.
108. Id. at 177.
109. Fischer, supra note 66, at 75; see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d
1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992) (holding that the 24 hour ban
on indecent broadcasts was unconstitutional); see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852
F.2d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that FCC failed to adequately consider alternatives and
offer reasonable support for its regulation limiting indecent broadcasts to the hours between
midnight and six a.m.); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
110. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969).
I1l. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. Pacifica involved a New York radio station that
broadcast satiric humorist George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue. The Court relied,
in part, on Red Lion, citing the scarcity doctrine as support for the FCC's regulatory power in
restricting broadcasts containing indecent language. Id. See generally National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
112. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88.
1996]
754 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
Cable television, however, has a significantly larger number of
channels available and, therefore, receives different treatment than
television broadcasters." 3  With the development of cable and satellite
television, the spectrum scarcity argument may no longer apply." 4 In
1984, the Supreme Court questioned the usefulness of the scarcity rationale
and invited Congress and the FCC to demonstrate that the useful life of the
scarcity rationale had not expired." 5
3. The Pervasive Nature of Television and Radio
In 1978, the Supreme Court adopted a pervasiveness rationale for
content-based regulations. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,"6 a New
York radio station broadcasted George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue at two o'clock in the afternoon." 7 The FCC determined that
the content of "Seven Dirty Words" was indecent and prohibited by
statute. 18 The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's determination that such
speech in the broadcast media was subject to regulation because the
broadcast media had become a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Americans.""' Listeners and viewers cannot avoid television and
radio broadcasts. "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning
off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow." 2 Speech that
is otherwise protected may be regulated where it invades the privacy rights
of another, particularly in the home.' 2' As such, an audience's privacy
rights outweigh the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters. 2
Justice Stevens noted that due to broadcasting's unique accessibility
to children, the content could be restricted to protect children from
indecency.'23 Justice Brennan, however, noted in his dissent that the
113. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994).
114. Id. But see Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2457 ("Although courts and
commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have declined to
question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence .... ").
115. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1984).
116. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
117. Id. at 729-30.
118. Id. at 731-32.
119. Id. at 748. The Court also relied on the fact that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible
to children." Id. at 749.
120. Id. at 748-49.
121. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
122. Id. at 748-49.
123. Id. at 749.
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offended listener can simply turn off the television or radio.'2 4 He opined
that the discomfort suffered by an offended listener does not outweigh the
"broadcaster's right to send.., a message entitled to full First Amendment
protection. '
Although indecent speech generally receives protection, the public has
a limited right not to be confronted with indecent speech inside the home.
The Supreme Court has recognized that regulations must balance the
broadcaster's First Amendment right with the public's right to be free from
exposure to indecent speech while at home.
4. Labeling Programs with a Violence Rating
Critics of the V-Chip argue that labeling programs with violence
ratings constitutes a content-based restriction. Their rationale is that
labeling imposes a direct penalty on expression and therefore will suppress
violent expression.'26 Furthermore, critics argue that implementation of
the FCC's rating system would be automatic, thus censoring programming
based on content rather than simply providing viewers with infor-
mation.'27 The argument lacks merit because the law specifically calls
for the formation of an independent advisory committee consisting largely
of broadcast industry personnel and parents.'28
Critics have also argued that since television violence exists outside
the traditional categories of subordinate speech, "a court could invalidate
a labeling statute on the basis that it unconstitutionally restricts protected
expression. '  However, the Supreme Court's past treatment of the
broadcast media provides support for advisory regulations. The Court has
repeatedly held that the government may justifiably regulate broadcasting
based on the limited broadcast spectrum.3' Therefore, content-based
restrictions are justified and labeling may be allowed.
124. Id. at 764-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 765-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Kim, supra note 27, at 1402 (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781
(1988)). In Riley the Court stated that "[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise
make necessarily alters the content of the speech [and is] ... a content-based regulation of
speech." Riley, 487 U.S. at 795; see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised
Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978).
127. Kim, supra note 27, at 1404. See also Jane M. Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating
System of 1968: A Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 185 (1973) (arguing that prior restraint, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment
doctrines apply to voluntary motion picture rating systems).
128. Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
129. Kim, supra note 27, at 1406.
130. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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If, however, labeling is informational, as opposed to content-based, it
would allow consumers to make more informed choices. Therefore,
informational labeling would not be restrictive. The Court would treat
labeling as simply requiring the disclosure of information and a strict
scrutiny analysis would not apply.'3'
C. The Problem of Defining Violence
Perhaps the most daunting issue arises from the fact that the law fails
to define violence and therefore raises immediate vagueness and
overbreadth concerns.' 32 If persons of "common intelligence" must guess
at the meaning of the statute, courts will find it void for vagueness.'33
Critics argue that the difficulties in defining violence will make the
task of identifying the least restrictive means of protecting viewers from
violent broadcasts virtually impossible. 34 A narrow definition may be
attacked on the ground that it fails to consider the context of the violence.
On the other hand, a broad definition may appear ambiguous because it
fails to provide sufficient direction to broadcasters in labeling programs.
But the V-Chip legislation does not specifically require broadcasters to
label programs with a violence rating. Instead, it merely invites broad-
casters to send a violence rating along with the program signal.'
The fundamental question that remains is how to define violence so
that it serves the purpose of the V-Chip legislation without being overbroad
or vague. The proffered definitions attempt to ascertain a fixed point
beyond which the content is considered "violent." Considering the different
types and various levels of violence found in the broadcast media, no single
definition will adequately encompass the scope of violence without being
vague or overbroad. One possible solution actually lies within the
technology of the V-Chip.
In recent trials of the V-Chip in Edmonton, Canada, programs were
rated from zero through five in three categories: violence, language, and
sexual content. 36  The use of these six rating slots facilitates a
heirarchical approach to defining violence, thus avoiding the overbroad
131. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring warning labels on
cigarette packages).
132. Deutsch, supra note 57, at 1106-08.
133. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).
134. Kim, supra note 27, at 1409.
135. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
136. Impoco, supra note 49, at D2.
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language that would otherwise be required. The violence rating definitions
used in the second Canadian test were as follows:
Level 0: None.
Level 1: Comedic - Includes some cartoons and slapstick
comedy.
Level 2: Mild - Includes non-injury physical contact, no
blood.
Level 3: Brief - Physical contact with minor or moderate
injury.
Level 4: Violent - Physical contact with serious injury or
death, limited blood. Includes shootings and other
weapon attacks.
Level 5: Graphic - Contact resulting in serious injury or
death. Includes graphic injury, dismemberment,
and death.'37
By utilizing a multi-level approach to defining violence in broadcast
media, many of the problems with vagueness and overbreadth can be
avoided. Distinguishing between various levels of violence provides far
greater flexibility in developing a comprehensive, overall definition that
remains clear, concise, and limited in scope.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tension between the desire to protect children from the harmful
effects of broadcast violence and the First Amendment rights of the
broadcast media continues. The V-Chip, however, will not likely become
the panacea for television violence for at least several years. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires new television sets to be
equipped with the V-Chip within two years, and legal challenges will likely
extend that deadline.'38 Furthermore, the V-Chip will not be completely
effective unless it is installed in every television accessible to children.
There are over twenty million television sets sold in the United States each
year, with over one-half of them purchased as a second television. 39 At
the present rate of television sales, at least a decade will pass before V-
Chip market penetration is broad enough to impact broadcast program-
ming. "
137. Id.
138. Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
139. Cerone, supra note 44, at A33.
140. Id.
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The Telecommunications Act does not expressly limit the free speech
rights of the media. 4' Broadcasters remain free to broadcast program-
ming as they so desire. Although the V-Chip is less intrusive than an
outright ban on televised violence, the risk of chilling free and protected
speech still exists. While studies have expressed opinions regarding the
impact of violent television on children,'42 the research does not
conclusively demonstrate that a reduction in televised violence furthers the
state's interest in protecting the well-being of children.'43
The V-Chip will likely reduce adult viewership, yet it will do so only
at times when children are present. The same adults that will have the
power to lockout programs with certain ratings will also have the power to
view those programs utilizing the same V-Chip circuitry. Requiring the
installation of the V-Chip into new televisions does not impose a direct
restriction on speech. But to be effective, the V-Chip requires that each
violent program carry a signal indicating its violent content and corres-
ponding rating. Requiring broadcasters to include such signals may
constitute mandatory speech on the part of the broadcasters; free speech
includes both the decision of what to say, as well as what not to say."'
The V-Chip legislation is the latest attempt to control television
violence, but is by no means free of controversy. The legislation remains
susceptible to First Amendment attack and is unlikely to fall within the
umbrella of any of the existing protected classes of speech. The vagueness
and overbreadth concerns in regards to the definition of violence are but a
few of the many relevant issues yet to be resolved. The heirarchic
approach to defining violence for rating purposes may alleviate some
vagueness and overbreadth concerns, but the V-Chip still has a long and
difficult fight ahead.
David V Scott
141. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1.
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